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Abstract: The endogenous growth literature has established the existence 
of an inverted-U curve between taxes and economic growth, namely a 
Growth Laffer Curve (GLC). We develop a growth model with public 
investment as the engine of perpetual growth, and look for the effect of 
deficit, tax and money financing on economic growth. We study in 
particular the way fiscal and monetary policies (through deficit and 
seigniorage respectively) deform the GLC. An empirical section based on a 
panel of developing countries provides GMM-system estimators that 
support our theoretical conclusions. 
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2 
I. Introduction 
 
 The relationship between taxes and economic growth is one of the oldest and most 
studied topics in economics. However, as recently acknowledged by Slemrod (2003), despite 
an impressive amount of contributions the existing literature has failed to establish a clear-cut 
link between taxes and economic growth. 
 The absence of a straightforward effect is connected to the existence of the so-called 
Laffer Curve, which describes a non-linear (inverted-U curve) relationship between taxes and 
fiscal revenues. However, the theoretical literature provides conflicting conclusions concerning 
the existence of such a curve. For example, Fullerton (1982) shows that the Laffer Curve may 
not be continuous or lack a maximum, while Novales & Ruiz (2002) argue that it may have 
several maxima. The empirical evidence for developed countries is also far from conclusive. 
Hsing (1996) finds a hump-shaped relation between taxes and fiscal revenues, but the 
robustness of his approach is criticized by Dalamagas (1998). In a recent paper, Trabandt & 
Uhligh (2006) emphasize that the link between taxes and revenues depends on the type of taxes 
(on capital, labor or consumption) or the use of the marginal or average tax rate.1 
 The relative absence of sound proof in favor of a Laffer Curve may be due to the fact 
that, when modifying taxes, Governments privilege economic growth, instead of fiscal 
revenues (Mitchell, 20022). In this paper we embrace this approach and focus on the presence 
of a “Growth Laffer Curve” (GLC) between economic growth and taxes. In an endogenous 
growth model with public investment, Barro (1990) shows that the presence of a GLC reflects 
the arbitrage between two conflicting effects. On the one hand, the increasing side of this GLC 
is a consequence of the fact that higher taxes provide more resources for public investment, 
which is growth-enhancing. On the other hand, higher taxes also generate more distortion on 
private capital accumulation and consequently on economic growth. Once the tax rate is above 
a threshold value, the economy reaches the slippery side of the GLC, and taxes and economic 
growth are negatively correlated. 
                                                 
1
 The difficulties related to the mere existence of a Laffer Curve are amplified when estimating its turning point. 
For developed countries, the optimal tax rate is apparently located somewhere between 35% (Hsing, 1996) and 
60% (Trabandt & Uhlig, 2006). Despite this heterogeneity, one result that emerges from the literature (see, among 
others, Floden & Linden, 2001, or Jonsson & Klein, 2003) is that taxes in the US are below their optimal level, 
while above it in France, Germany or Northern Europe. This raises of course the question of why Governments 
would over/under estimate their taxes. Among several explanations, Buchanan & Lee (1982) consider the 
presence of two Laffer Curves, in the short-run and long-run respectively. If Governments focus on the short-run, 
they may fix a tax rate that is different from the one that is optimal in the long-run. 
2
 “Putting revenue maximization ahead of sound tax policy is therefore a misguided approach and should be 
discarded” (page 8). 
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 If the theoretical existence of a GLC is a rather well established result, the empirical 
evidence on developed countries is still weak (see, for example, Bleaney, Gemmel & Kneller, 
2001, or Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti & Schiantarelli, 2002), and virtually non existent for 
developing countries. Concerning the latter, in one of the very few contributions on the topic, 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) assert that “the evidence that tax rates matter for economic growth is 
disturbingly fragile” (page 442). 
 Several explanations are put forward in order to elucidate the absence of a GLC in 
developing countries. For example, Becsi (2000) considers that the profile of the GLC is 
sensitive to the use of collected revenues (public consumption or public investment). Since 
public spending efficiency is difficult to assess, particularly in developing countries, 
measurement errors may induce a bias in the estimation of the GLC. Alternatively, Heijman & 
van Ophen (2005) find that the “black market” distorts the GLC. The presence of a substantial 
tax evasion in developing countries may therefore be an impediment to finding a GLC.  
 In order to establish the presence of a GLC in developing countries, we propose in this 
paper a different strategy, based on the interaction between the GLC and the two other methods 
of Government finance, namely fiscal deficits and seigniorage. Indeed, developing countries 
typically rely on these two financing methods; it is therefore appealing to explore the 
relationship between taxes and growth when accounting for public deficits and seigniorage.3 
 Consequently, we develop an endogenous growth model in which public investment 
may be financed by taxes, seigniorage or public debt. We emphasize a GLC between taxes and 
growth and study the way deficits and seigniorage deform the GLC. First, we find that cutting 
deficits or raising seigniorage always lowers the GLC-maximizing tax-rate. Second, a higher 
deficit is always growth-reducing and thus moves the GLC downwards, while the effect of 
seigniorage on the GLC may be subject to nonlinearities. 
Subsequently, we test these conclusions of the theoretical model by using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. We find a GLC between taxes and growth 
for a panel of developing countries, when accounting for its interaction with fiscal deficits or 
seigniorage. Cutting deficits or raising seigniorage reduces the GLC-maximizing tax-rate, 
while an increase in deficits or seigniorage decreases economic growth, as in our theoretical 
model. In addition, to check for the robustness of the influence of seigniorage on the GLC, we 
distinguish between developing countries with restricted (fixed or quasi fixed) and unrestricted 
exchange rate regimes. The results are unchanged for countries with unrestricted monetary 
                                                 
3
 In addition, as these resources are meant to finance public investment, our analysis comes close to a recent 
developed concept, namely the “fiscal space”, which depicts the way a given amount (or an increase) of public 
spending may be optimally financed through different means of financing (see Roy & Heuty, 2009). 
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4 
policies. However, we find no evidence of a GLC indexed by seigniorage for countries with 
restricted monetary policy, suggesting that seigniorage does not significantly distort the 
relationship between taxes and growth in these countries, most likely because it is not an 
important way of Government finance when the exchange rate regime is restricted. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two develops the model and 
exhibits the way deficits and seigniorage impact the GLC, while in section three we test our 
theoretical results on a panel of developing countries using the GMM technique, and section 
four concludes. 
 
II. The model 
In this section we introduce the theoretical mechanism that we want to test in section 
three. Consider a closed economy with an infinitely lived representative agent and two 
authorities: a Government and a Central Bank. 
The representative agent has two sources of revenue, from production and from 
interest-bearing public debt. At each period t , output tY  is generated using private capital tK  
and productive public expenditures tG , with 10 << ε  the elasticity of output with respect to 
private capital: 
 ( ) εε −== 1, ttttt GKGKFY         (1) 
Population is normalized to unity and all variables may be interpreted as per capita. 
Public spending stands for public investment (it has a flow dimension, but considering public 
investment that has a stock dimension, as in Futagami, Morita & Shibata, 1992, would leave 
our results unchanged) and we abstract from congestion effects, so the production function is 
close to Barro (1990).4  
The representative agent may hold Government bonds ( tB ), which return the real 
interest rate ( tr ). Interest revenues and output may be used for (private) investment ( tt KK δ+& , 
with δ  the private capital depreciation, and dtdKK tt /≡& ), for buying new bonds ( tB& 5), for 
(private) consumption ( tC ) and for paying flat rate taxes on output ( )tYτ .6 Households also 
                                                 
4
 Under the condition 10 << ε , the production function has decreasing returns to scale which enables the 
existence of a competitive equilibrium (remark that tG  is exogenous for households). However, in equilibrium 
tG  will be endogenously determined and production will exhibit constant returns (a necessary condition for the 
presence of an endogenous growth long-run path). 
5
 We could easily extend the model to the presence of private bonds. However, in our representative agent model, 
private bonds are not held in equilibrium, thus Government is the only debtor. 
6
 Taxing interests on public debt would not change the model, except for the shadow variables in the 
maximization program. 
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5 
hold real money tM&  (with ttt PMM /
~
≡  the real money stock, tM
~
 the nominal money stock 
and tP  the price level) and tt Mpi  stands for the real money stock depreciation per unit of time 
(with ttt PP /&≡pi  the inflation rate and ttt rR += pi  the nominal interest rate). Consequently, the 
representative agent budget constraint is: 
( ) ( ) ( )tttttttttt MMBKKCYBr piδτ +++++=−+ &&&1      (2) 
 Under the budget constraint, the representative household maximizes the present value 
of discounted intertemporal utility of the flow of consumption, with 0>β  the discount rate: 
( ) ( )dttCUW t∫
∞
−=
0
exp β         (3) 
To obtain an endogenous growth path, we consider an isoelastic instantaneous utility 
function, with constant elasticity of substitution CtCC UCU //1 −=σ  ( dCdUUC /≡ ): 
( )
( )



=
≠
−
−
=
−
1,
1,
1
11
σ
σ
σ
σ
forCLog
forCCU
t
t
t        (4) 
To conceive the existence of an optimum for welfare maximization, the intertemporal 
utility U  should be bounded, which leads to ( ) βγσ <− C1 , with xγ  the long-run growth rate 
of variable x .7 
 
To motivate a money demand, we suppose that the household is money constrained on 
his consumption and investment, via a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. To simplify 
calculations, we suppose, with no qualitative impact on results, that public spending is also 
subject to the CIA constraint:8 
( )[ ] ttttt MGKKC =+++ δφ &         (5) 
In standard CIA models, coefficient φ  is a constant parameter. In this paper, we 
suppose that φ  may negatively depend on nominal interest rate: if the nominal interest rate 
increases, households attempt to save real balances and adopt more efficient means of payment 
(such as credit cards, for example). In other words, money velocity ( )1/φ  will increase in 
periods being characterized by high interest rates (a higher interest rate increases the 
                                                 
7
 The latter condition corresponds to a no-Ponzi game constraint, rC <γ . 
8
 Assuming a CIA constraint on consumption and private investment only (a case first studied by Stockman, 1981, 
in an exogenous growth setup) does not qualitatively change the model. The presence of public investment in the 
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6 
opportunity cost of money; consequently, the real-money demand is lower, and money velocity 
is higher, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Mendizabal, 2006). 
In what follows, we assert that: ( )tRφ φ= , with ( ) ( ) 0/ <≡ tttR dRRdRt φφ . This 
procedure allows generalizing the CIA technology, which can be compared to more general 
“transactions cost” technologies (see Minea & Villieu, 2009a, for the micro-foundations of the 
underlying “transaction cost” model). In equilibrium ( )( )t t t t tY C K K Gδ= + + +& , such a 
specification provides a quite general and usual demand for real balances, depending both on 
real income and, if ( ) 0<tR Rtφ , on nominal interest rate: ( ) ttt YRM φ= .9 We find the CIA 
technology strictly speaking when ( ) 0=tR Rtφ , so that φ  becomes a constant parameter. 
 
The Central Bank and the Government 
We focus next on the monetary block of the model. The banking system generates the 
nominal stock of money tM
~
 (since (5) yields a transaction money demand, one might consider 
that tM
~
 includes all means of payment: cash balances and deposit accounts). The Central Bank 
fixes the nominal stock of high-powered money tH
~
, which is linked to the nominal money 
stock by a standard “money multiplier” ( )1/ 1η >  such that: ( ) tt HM ~/1~ η= . The multiplier may 
depend on the ratio of banknotes to the stock of money and on bank reserve requirements, 
which we do not model explicitly.10 Money market equilibrium will define the price level 
ttttt MHMMP η/
~/~ == . Thus, in our model, “high-powered money”, which provides 
seigniorage for government finance, must be distinguished from money used in transactions. 
The higher the multiplier, the more important the share of money generated by private banks, 
and the greater the discrepancy between the stock of money used for transactions (the one in 
the CIA constraint) and the stock of high-powered money. Consequently, only part of the 
seigniorage on the total money stock is retrieved by the Central Bank. 
We suppose that the monetary policy of the Central Bank involves an exogenous 
growth rate on the nominal money stock ( ω=tt MM
~/~& ) and consequently on the base money 
                                                                                                                                                          
CIA yields a simple money demand, tt YM φ=  in equilibrium, which simplifies calculations. We assume a strictly 
positive interest rate, so that the CIA constraint holds as equality. 
9
 Such a functional form in which money demand depends on the interest rate appears in the CIA model with 
credit goods and cash goods of Lucas & Stokey (1987), for example. 
10
 Some micro-foundations of the money multiplier η  can be found in Englund & Svensson (1988) or Hartley 
(1988), in cash-in-advance models including two types of goods: “cash goods”, to be paid with cash reserves and 
“check goods” which need bank deposits.  
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7 
( tt HH
~/~&=ω ), since the multiplier is constant. The Central Bank collects seigniorage on the 
(real) monetary base, namely ttt MPH ωηω =/
~
 and transfers it at no cost to Government. 
Whenever Government resources (from taxes and seigniorage) are insufficient to 
finance public investment, it may run into deficits, in which case the Government must pay 
interest on the issued debt, so that its budget constraint is (in real terms): 
( ) tttttt BBrMYG &=++− ηωτ         (6) 
With respect to Barro (1990) balanced budget constraint, we allow here for an 
unbalanced budget and for money financing. Indeed, in an endogenous growth setup, one may 
study the long-run effects of permanent deficits. On the one hand, since all variables grow at 
the same rate in the steady-state, the public debt growth rate should be equal to this balanced 
economic growth rate, that we denote by *γ . Consequently, we can introduce permanent (long-
run) deficits. On the other hand, the intertemporal government budget constraint does not 
restrain public debt to be constant in the long run, but only its growth rate to be lower than the 
real interest rate (or, the no-Ponzi game condition). Therefore, deficits cannot be “too high” in 
the long-run. 
One simple manner to fulfill these conditions is to assume that the Government targets 
a long-run debt to GDP ratio, namely ( ) θ=*/YB  (a star stands for steady-state values).11 This 
assumption is compatible with the existence of permanent deficits in the long-run, and the 
deficit ratio associated with the target θ  is simply: ( ) θγ **/ =≡ YBd & . Remark also that the 
solvability condition ( ( ) ***/ rBB <= γ& ) holds if *d r θ<  in the long-run. 
 
Steady-state equilibrium 
The household maximizes (3) subject to (1)-(2)-(4)-(5), given 0k  and a standard 
transversality condition (see Appendix 1 for details). As usual in growth models, we define 
intensive variables KCc /≡ , KMm /≡ , KGg /≡ , KBb /≡ , and derive the long-run 
growth solution by setting 0==== bgmc &&&& . By so doing, we find constant c , m , g  and b  
values, so that initial variables ( C , M , G , B , K ) grow at the same constant rate γ . 
Appendix 1 shows that the steady-state may be depicted by two relations between γ  and g : 
                                                 
11
 In what follows, θ  informs us about the way public debt distorts the relation between taxes and long-run 
growth. Thus, θ  may be equally interpreted as describing the fiscal stance of Government. 
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8 
( )
( )
*1
*
* *
1
/
1
g
R R
εε τγ δ β σφ
− 
−
 = − −
+  
       (7) 
( ) ( )[ ] εγθηωφτ /1*** SRg −+=        (8) 
We define ( ) ( ) ** 1 γσβγ −−≡S  and the nominal interest rate is ( )** γω SR +=  in the long-run. 
The first relation is simply the Keynes-Ramsey relation ( ) σβγ // −== rCC&  in the 
long-run. If we abstract from the transaction cost constraint by setting 0=φ , the real interest 
rate would match the net return of private investment: ( ) ( ) δτεδτ ε −−=−−= −111 gFr K . 
However, with transaction costs ( )0φ > , the return on capital is deflated by the transaction 
cost on new capital goods ( )( )RRφ+1 , with the nominal interest rate: 
( )γωγωω SrMMrR +=−+=−+= /& . Equation (8) reproduces the government constraint 
(6): ( ) mggbr ηωτγ ε −−=− −1 , with αθ −= 1gb  in steady-state, and the real money demand 
coming from the CIA constraint (5): ( ) εφ −= 1gRm , with δγε −−−= − ggc 1  in equilibrium. 
Using (7)-(8), we find an implicit equation for the long-run economic growth:12 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )
( ) σβδφ
θγηωφττεγ
εε
/
1
1
**
/1**
*








−−
+
−+−
=
−
RR
SR
    (9) 
with ( ) ** 1 γσβω −−+=R  and ( ) ( ) ** 1 γσβγ −−=S . 
 
Taxes and economic growth: the augmented Growth Laffer Curve 
 As developed in the Introduction, the Laffer Curve describes an inverted-U relation 
between taxes and fiscal revenues. However, since fiscal revenues are constantly growing in 
steady-state in endogenous growth models, the Laffer Curve is replaced by a Growth Laffer 
Curve (GLC) between taxes and long-run economic growth. 
Similarly to Barro (1990), our model exhibits a hump-shaped curve that links economic 
growth and taxes. We can see in (9) that a higher tax rate lowers growth through the term 
( )τ−1 : this negative influence captures the distortion of a higher flat-rate tax on private capital 
accumulation and consequently on long-run growth. Simultaneously, higher taxes allow for 
more resources that Government may use to finance public investment, which stimulates 
private capital accumulation and economic growth. This favorable effect of taxes is described 
                                                 
12
 We propose below an explicit value of *γ  for the case 1=σ  (a logarithmic instantaneous utility function). 
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9 
by the second term of the numerator in (9). Using the implicit-function theorem, we may find 
the tax rate that maximizes long-run growth (namely, τˆ ):13 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]θγηωφεετ **1ˆ SR −−−= , with ( )** γω SR +=     (10) 
 Equations (9)-(10) show that both the public debt θ  and the money growth rate ω  
influence not only the GLC between taxes and economic growth, but also the GLC-
maximizing tax rate τˆ . We explore below the direction of these effects. 
 With respect to public debt, we notice that, ceteris paribus, any increase in the long-run 
debt-to-income ratio ( )θ  weakens long-run economic growth: * / 0d dγ θ < , for the solvability 
condition ( ) ( ) *** 01 <−−= γσβγS  to hold. Since Governments are forbidden to play Ponzi 
games, new resources from deficits in the steady state ( )BBB B *γγ ==&  are always falling short 
with respect to the debt cost (the debt burden rB ). Consequently, the permanent net flow of 
resources provided by public debt financing in steady-state is negative. Thus, ceteris paribus, 
productive spending must fall or distorsive taxes must go up, explaining why long-run growth 
is reduced.14 Our result still holds when considering an increase in the deficit ratio instead of 
the public debt ratio (see Figure 1 below and Minea & Villieu, 2009b).15 
This finding exerts two effects on the GLC. First, since the negative effect of public 
debt holds for any value of the tax rate, a raise in θ  moves the GLC downwards (for any value 
of the tax rate τ ). Second, the GLC-maximizing tax rate is increasing in θ . The intuitive 
explanation of the second result is that, compared to a no-debt no-money case ( 0== φθ , 
ετ −= 1ˆB  as in Barro, 1990), an upward jump in θ  lowers long-run growth, since the public-
debt burden crowds out productive expenditures. To restore (part of) productive expenditures, 
government must increase the tax rate beyond the Barro value Bτˆ . 
 
                                                 
13
 Rewriting (9) as an implicit function ( ) 0,,, =Ω θτωγ , the total differential is: 
0=
∂
Ω∂
+
∂
Ω∂
+
∂
Ω∂
+
∂
Ω∂ θ
θ
ω
ω
τ
τ
γ
γ
dddd  and the tax-ceiling is obtained from 0=∂
Ω∂
∂
Ω∂
−=
γττ
γ
d
d
. 
14
 In percentage of income, the term ( )Br γ−  corresponds precisely to ( ) ( )[ ]θγσβθγ ** 1−−=S  in (9).  
15
 The effect of an increase in the public debt (deficit) ratio on economic growth may be different if we allow for 
the public debt not to be paid back (for example, public debt in developing countries is often external and is 
subjected to periodical alleviations). However, the analysis of debt alleviation policies at international level, which 
involves several specific problems (aid or debt alleviation is accorded conditioning to macroeconomic objectives, 
the donators may have other goals than public investment,…) is beyond the scope of this paper. Differentiating 
between domestic (internal) public debt (as in our model) and external public debt leaves our results unchanged, 
but complicates the model (we should allow for an open economy setup). On the contrary, if we consider the 
possibility that Government may not repay public debt, a “free lunch” problem may appear, namely the 
Government may increase public investment and economic growth at no cost. We may introduce an exogenous 
parameter to account for the share of the public debt which is not repaid, but we consider instead that θ  is the 
share of public debt that must be paid back. 
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Contrary to the monotonous influence of public debt on long-run growth, seigniorage 
describes an inverted-U curve with respect to economic growth.16 This curve reflects the trade-
off between the positive influence of an increase in the money growth rate ω  (according to the 
numerator of (9), a higher money growth rate yields extra resources for growth-enhancing 
public investment) and its negative impact through higher transaction costs (denominator of 
relation (9)). The economic growth-maximizing money growth rate is:17 
( )( )
( ) ( )R
RR
R αθηφφ
φ
θτα
ω
+−
−−
=
1
ˆ
 where: ( ) ( )( ) ( )R
RR R φηφε
φφε
α
+−
+
=
11
, with ( )
dR
Rd
R
φφ ≡   (11) 
Consequently, the effect of ω  on the GLC depends on the relative position of ω  with 
respect to ωˆ . Raising ω  increases economic growth if ωω ˆ< , but decreases it if ωω ˆ> . 
However, raising the money growth rate always decreases the growth-maximizing tax rate 
( 0/ˆ <ωτ dd ): since seigniorage resources are more important, the Government may cut the 
optimal tax τˆ  (or to put it differently, seigniorage and taxes are substitute instruments for 
Government financing). 
 
Analytical results and some simulations 
To find explicit results, suppose a logarithmic instantaneous utility function ( )1=σ  and 
a strict CIA technology ( ( )Rφ φ= ). The long-run economic growth rate *γ  and growth-
maximizing values τˆ  and ωˆ  simplify to: 
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) βδβωφβω
βθβωηωφττεγ
εε
−−
+++
−++−
=
−
1
1 /1*
     (9’) 
( ) ( )ρθηωφεετ −−−= 1ˆ         (10’) 
( )( ) ( )
( )12
11
ˆ
−
−−+−
=
εηφ
βθτεφβεη
ω        (11’) 
 One can easily verify in (9’)-(10’) our previous findings in the general case. An 
increase in the debt ratio decreases economic growth in (9’), moves downwards the GLC, and 
increases the optimal tax rate τˆ  in (10’). The effect on the GLC of an increase in the money-
growth rate ω  depends on the ωˆ  value (see (9’)), but raising ω  always decreases τˆ  in (10’). 
                                                 
16
 Our model is compatible with extensive empirical evidence supporting the presence of non linearities between 
money (inflation) and economic growth (see, among others, the recent contributions of Arai, Kinnwall & 
Skogman, 2004, and Burdekin, Denzau, Keil, Sitthiyot & Willett, 2004). 
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Results in the general case are also confirmed by our simulations below, performed for 
the functional from ( ) 5.02 −= tt RR φφ  and usual values for parameters.18 
a) the effect of public debt and deficit on the GLC 
In Figure 1, we represent the change in the growth Laffer curve following a rise in the 
long-run debt target ( )θ  or in the long-run deficit ratio ( )d . According to the left chart of 
Figure 1, raising the public debt to GDP ratio exerts two effects on the relation between taxes 
(horizontal axis) and long-run economic growth (vertical axis). First, the GLC moves 
downwards. Second, the GLC-maximizing tax rate increases in response to an increase in θ , as 
we have seen.  
Considering deficit, instead of public debt, has no qualitative effect on these results, as 
shown in the right chart of Figure 1. Since the deficit to GDP ratio is ( ) θγ **/ =≡ YBd & , we 
replace θ  with */d γ  in (9) and obtain similar partial derivatives. Thus, the GLC still moves 
downwards and its maximum still moves towards the right, in response to a rise in the deficit 
ratio. In the empirical section below, we take advantage of this correspondence between a 
change in public debt and a change in the deficit ratio.  
Figure 1 – The simulated effect of public debt and deficit on the GLC 
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 From the total differential of ( ) 0,,, =Ω θτωγ , namely 0=
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d
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 The elasticity of output with respect to public capital is 20% ( 20.01 =− ε ), private capital, the discount rate and 
the money growth rate are between 5% and 10%, financial development is set to 0.5 (on a scale from 0 to 1), and 
the consumption elasticity of substitution ( σ/1 ) is between 0.5 and 1. 
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b) the effect of seigniorage on the GLC 
 Figure 2 below depicts the impact of monetary policy on the GLC. According to (9), 
the effect of a change in ω  depends on its relative value with respect to ωˆ . Figure 2 illustrates 
the only two possible cases: raising ω  increases economic growth when ωω ˆ<  (the left hand 
side picture), but decreases economic growth if ωω ˆ>  (the right hand side picture). However, 
the effect of ω  on the GLC-maximizing tax rate τˆ  does not depend on the ωˆ  value: in both 
pictures, raising ω  always decreases τˆ . Of course, the threshold ωˆ  depends on all parameters 
of the model in our simulations, and will depend on structural characteristics of countries in the 
econometric estimations. 
Figure 2 – The simulated effect of the seigniorage on the GLC  
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
τ
γ
ω=0
ω=0.05
ω=0.1
 
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
0.07
0.075
0.08
τ
γ
ω=0
ω=0.05
ω=0.1
 
1.5,σ =  0.1β δ= = , 0.8ε = ,  
0.75θ = , 0.9η = , 0.25φ =  
,2=σ  0.05β = , 0.1δ = , 0.8ε = ,  
5.0=θ , 0.1η = , 5.0=φ  
 
In the following section we attempt to confirm empirically our results concerning the 
shifts of the GLC in response to jumps in the deficit ratio and seigniorage, using a panel of 
developing countries. 
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III. The empirical evidence of the interaction between deficit, seigniorage, and the GLC 
 
The econometric model and data presentation 
The goal of this section is to test empirically the conclusions of our theoretical model. 
We focus on a panel of 48 developing countries19 (Appendix 2 presents the list of countries 
included in our sample) over the period 1980-2006. In order to reduce the potential effects of 
unaccounted short-term fluctuations, all variables are computed as five-year averages, for the 
following five sub-periods 1980-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000 and 2001-2006. 
Considering the lack of availability of data on public debt, in this section we use data on 
deficit (instead of public debt). Since both variables provide the same qualitative conclusions 
in the theoretical model, as illustrated by Figure 1, using deficits does not raise any specific 
issue. Adopting the notations from the theoretical model, we aim to estimate the following two 
equations (with i  and t  country and time period indicators respectively): 
ittiitititititititit uXdd ++++++++= λµατατατατααγ 52432210    (12) 
 ittiitititititititit uX ++++++++= λµβωτβωτβτβτββγ 52432210    (13) 
The dependent variable is the rate of growth of per capita GDP ( )itγ , the vector itX  
captures different control variables (to be discussed below), iµ  stands for country fixed effects, 
tλ  is a time-specific effect that controls for unaccounted common time-varying factors and itu  
is a standard error term. According to the theoretical model, the terms in tax ( )itτ  and square 
tax ( )2itτ  capture the existence of a GLC, while their alternative interaction with fiscal deficits 
( )itd  in equation (12), respectively seigniorage ( )itω  in equation (13), is intended to search for 
the way fiscal or monetary policies deform the GLC. To put it differently, we test for the 
existence of a set of GLC indexed by either deficit (in (12)) or seigniorage (in (13)). 
 We split variables in two categories, namely interest and control variables. Within the 
first group, we define the tax rate as the Government revenue, excluding grants, in % of GDP 
(source GFS and IMF Article IV). We compute the deficit as the difference between spending 
(source World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI), and African WDI for countries 
with too many missing values) and revenues (including grants), both in % of GDP. Finally, we 
measure seigniorage as the change in reserve money (line 14a of IFS, IMF) as % of nominal 
GDP (line 99b in IFS, IMF). 
                                                 
19
 We consider all low-income and lower-middle-income economies in the World Bank classification for which 
data are available (in particular, there are many missing values mainly in the deficit and education variables). 
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We establish the control variables (the vector itX ) by drawing on the recent growth 
literature (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993, Temple, 1999, or Adam & Bevan, 2005) and focusing on 
traditional explanatory variables for economic growth. First, we include the log of initial per 
capita GDP in order to search for a catching-up effect. Second, one of the most widely used 
determinants of growth is the investment-to-GDP ratio (it includes both private and public 
investment), which is measured as the gross capital formation in % of GDP. The third control 
variable is the human capital (approximated by the percentage of secondary school attained in 
total population). Finally, the two remaining controls are the degree of trade openness (exports 
plus imports in % of GDP) and the population growth rate. With the exception of human 
capital (from the Barro-Lee dataset), all control variables are extracted from WDI (see 
Appendix 3 for several descriptive statistics). 
 
Empirical evidence of the existence of a GLC in developing countries 
It is widely asserted that growth regressions are fraught with many concerns (see, 
among others, Islam, 1995, Caselli, Esquivel & Lefort, 1996, or Temple, 1999). As discussed 
by Caselli et al. (1996), there exist mainly two sources of inconsistency in the empirical work 
on economic growth, both in cross-section and panel analysis. First, the incorrect treatment of 
country-specific effects, representing differences in technology or tastes, gives rise to the 
omitted variables bias. Second, most regressors might be endogenous to economic growth, and 
the presence of simultaneous or reversed causality can generate a bias in the estimation. 
In addition to these problems, our analysis based on panel data produces a third issue 
that must be dealt with. Indeed, the presence of the initial level of per capita GDP (equivalent 
to the lagged dependent variable) as explanatory variable may produce biased coefficient 
estimates, since initial per capita GDP is by construction correlated with the error-term 
(Nickell, 1981). 
One way to handle (i) the unobserved country-specific effects and (ii) the endogeneity 
of explanatory variables and of the lagged dependent variable, is to use the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique. The first-differenced GMM estimator, proposed by 
Arellano & Bond (1991), instruments the right-hand-side variables in the first-difference 
equations using levels of the series in lag (of one period or more). However, subsequent 
evidence (Arellano & Bover, 1995, and Blundell & Bond, 1998) highlights that when the 
explanatory variables are persistent over time, the lagged levels of these variables are weak 
instruments for the equations in differences and suggests an estimator that reduces potential 
biases and imprecision associated with the difference estimator. This GMM-system estimator 
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combines in a system the previous regressions in differences instrumented by lagged values, 
with an additional set of equations in levels, by using lagged first differences as instruments. 
 
The results of the GMM-System estimation for the GLC conditional to deficit (equation 
(12)) and seigniorage (equation (13)) are reported in Table 1. Remark first that for each of the 
four regressions [1]-[4], the Sargan test of over-identification and the test of second-order 
autocorrelation (AR(2)) support the validity of our GMM-system estimations.20 
 Regressions [1]-[2] test the existence of a GLC indexed by the deficit ratio, as 
explained in equation (12). Before discussing the impact of variables on interest, note that a 
certain number of regularities emerge among the control variables. First, a higher (private and 
public) investment to GDP ratio significantly increases economic growth (as in our theoretical 
model). Second, the initial level of per capita GDP is significantly inversely correlated with 
economic growth, which reflects the conditional convergence among the developing countries 
of our sample. Third, we find some evidence supporting the positive impact of human capital 
in developing countries. Finally, in regressions [2] and [4] we control for population growth 
and the degree of openness. However, since coefficients are not significant, their effect on 
economic growth is uncertain. 
 
Table 1 – The GLC conditional to deficit and seigniorage 
  Growth Growth 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENT GMM-System GMM-System 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Tax 1α  0.496* 0.589** 0.426* 0.374* 
  (0.287) (0.291) (0.243) (0.216) 
      
Tax2 2α  -0.0113** -0.0120** -0.0115** -0.0102** 
  (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0049) 
      
Tax*Deficit 3α  -0.0445** -0.0532**   
  (0.0220) (0.0238)   
      
Tax2 *Deficit 4α  0.00108*** 0.00125***   
  (0.00043) (0.00045)   
      
Tax*Seigniorage 3β    -0.302** -0.280** 
    (0.135) (0.118) 
      
Tax2 *Seigniorage 4β    0.00804*** 0.00746*** 
    (0.00288) (0.00259) 
      
Deficit  0.328 0.426 -0.0816 -0.0620 
  (0.283) (0.282) (0.0712) (0.0763) 
Seigniorage  -0.202 -0.290** 1.907 1.668 
  (0.156) (0.127) (1.311) (1.137) 
                                                 
20
 The Sargan test of over-identification tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, since not correlated 
with the residual. The AR(2) test assesses the absence of second-order serial correlation (H0).  
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Seigniorage2    -0.0412 -0.0361 
    (0.0397) (0.0360) 
Initial GDP / capita (log)  -1.743** -1.476** -2.188*** -1.968*** 
  (0.729) (0.736) (0.634) (0.678) 
      
Investment  0.266*** 0.251*** 0.286*** 0.286*** 
  (0.083) (0.067) (0.052) (0.054) 
Education  0.0633* 0.0868** 0.0876** 0.0948** 
  
(0.0378) (0.0430) (0.0393) (0.042) 
Population Growth   0.330  0.222 
   (0.319)  (0.354) 
Openness   -0.0372*  -0.0066 
   (0.0213)  (0.0276) 
      
      
Observations  163 163 163 163 
Number of countries  48 48 48 48 
AR(2) p-value  0.637 0.571 0.246 0.238 
Sargan (p-value)  0.367 0.307 0.395 0.390 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant and time fixed effects included in all 
estimations. The population growth and the education rate are treated as exogenous whereas the other variables 
are considered as not strictly exogenous and are instrumented with their first-order to third-order lagged values. 
 
 We now turn our attention to our main goal, namely the interaction between the GLC 
and fiscal deficits. In both regressions [1]-[2], all terms that include taxes are significant. The 
coefficients of the squared terms in taxes support the existence of an inverted-U curve, 
irrespective of the value of deficit in our sample (since itit dd ∀<+ ,042 αα ). Furthermore, the 
estimated tax rate that maximizes this curve is positive, since itit dd ∀>+ ,031 αα . 
Consequently, the econometric evidence supports the existence of the GLC curve indexed by 
the deficit ratio, as described by Figure 3 (for estimated coefficients from regression [1]). 
 
Figure 3 – GLC reaction following a change in the deficit-to-GDP ratio (regression [1]) 
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According to Figure 3, a higher deficit generates two effects on the relation between 
taxes and economic growth. First, it moves the GLC downwards for all tax values in our 
sample: at a given tax rate, raising deficits lowers economic growth. Second, a higher deficit 
increases the GLC-maximizing estimated tax rate, which is around 22%. These two empirical 
results corroborate our theoretical findings and confirm that, in developing countries, there 
exists a hump-shaped curve between taxes and economic growth, and that this GLC changes in 
response to a change in the deficit to GDP ratio. Finally, note that the estimated GLC-
maximizing tax rate (τˆ ) is comparable to its value in the theoretical model, namely slightly 
superior to 1 20%ε− = . 
We focus next on the relationship between the GLC and seigniorage. Regressions [3]-
[4] support the presence of a significant GLC indexed by the seigniorage value for the 
developing countries in our sample. Figure 4 below plots the family of GLC curves with 
respect to several seigniorage values. 
 
Figure 4 – GLC reaction following a change in the seigniorage-to-GDP ratio (regression [3]) 
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Robustness analysis 
The relation between taxes, seigniorage and growth is likely to be different according to 
the extent to which it is possible for the Government to finance public expenditures with 
seigniorage. One can expect that the existence of a GLC conditioned by the level of 
seigniorage might be less pertinent in countries where the use of seigniorage, as an alternative 
financing method, is highly limited. We investigate this issue in Table 2 by dividing our 
sample into two sub-samples of developing countries, according to their degree of rigidity in 
their exchange rate arrangements.21 The first category regroups countries whose monetary 
policy is restrained, because of a fixed exchange rate arrangement, and the second one consists 
of countries whose monetary policy is subject to fewer constraints, partly because of a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. 
Table 2 – GLC conditional to seigniorage with respect to the monetary policy regime 
 Growth - GMM-System 
VARIABLES Fixed exchange rate regime Flexible exchange rate regime 
 [5A] [5B] 
Tax 0.0375 0.837* 
 (0.239) (0.508) 
 
  
Tax2 -0.00237 -0.0224** 
 (0.00574) (0.0102) 
   
Tax*Seigniorage 0.263 -0.399** 
 (0.421) (0.195) 
   
Tax2 *Seigniorage -0.00356 0.0106** 
 (0.00874) (0.0050) 
   
Seigniorage -1.346 2.434 
 (3.582) (1.701) 
Seigniorage2 -1.185** -0.0487 
 (0.428) (0.0424) 
Deficit -0.277** 0.0368 
 (0.093) (0.0775) 
Initial GDP per capita (log) -0.813 -1.058 
 (1.589) (0.922) 
Investment 0.213*** 0.202** 
 (0.035) (0.087) 
Education 0.091 0.076** 
 (0.141) (0.036) 
Population Growth -0.173 0.399 
 (0.631) (0.347) 
Openness -0.0266 -0.0408 
 (0.0249) (0.0320) 
Observations 53 110 
Number of countries 14 34 
AR(2) p-value 0.043 0.692 
Sargan (p-value) 1.000 0.965 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Constant and time fixed effects included in all 
estimations. The population growth and the education rate are treated as exogenous whereas the other variables 
are considered as not strictly exogenous and are instrumented with their first-order to third-order lagged values. 
                                                 
21
 The distinction between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is made according to the 2004 IMF 
classification system based on members’ actual arrangements as identified by IMF staff (see Appendix 4). An 
alternative option would be to use the degree of Central Bank independence to distinguish between countries. 
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For the 14 countries with a constrained exchange rate regime (regression [5A]), the 
presence of GLC conditioned by the level of seigniorage is not verified empirically. This may 
be due either to the small size of the sample (which may affect the robustness of the estimation 
results, as indicated by the AR(2) and Sargan tests), but also to the fact that in these countries, 
seigniorage is not an important financing mean of public spending (because they cannot 
(easily) resort to seigniorage) and will therefore not significantly interact with taxes in terms of 
economic growth effects. 
Second, regression [5B] confirms that seigniorage had a significant influence on the 
relation between taxes and economic growth in the countries that were less constrained in their 
monetary policy over the period 1980-2006. Moreover, raising seigniorage lowers the GLC-
maximizing tax rate in line with theoretical conclusion, and reduces, as expected, economic 
growth (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5 – The effect of seigniorage on the GLC in countries with flexible exchange rate 
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or a higher money-growth rate reduces the GLC-maximizing tax rate. This may explain why 
Governments have difficulties in defining a fiscal policy that perfectly matches the optimal tax 
rate. On the other hand, a higher deficit ratio always moves the GLC downwards, while the 
effect of seigniorage is subject to nonlinearities. 
 Empirical evidence using the GMM technique on a sample of developing countries 
supports our theoretical conclusions, namely the presence of a hump-shaped relation between 
taxes and economic growth, indexed by deficit and seigniorage. However, the empirical 
analysis provides three additional results. First, higher seigniorage reduces economic growth 
for the countries in our sample. According to our theoretical model, this negative relation 
between seigniorage and growth, also emphasized by Bose, Holman & Neanidis (2007), may 
be explained by the fact that countries are located above the threshold in seigniorage. If this is 
the case, these countries may probably increase economic growth by reducing seigniorage. 
Second, there is no significant interaction between seigniorage and the GLC in 
countries with restricted monetary policy (with fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, for 
example). Consequently, one must be careful in assessing the influence of policy mix on 
economic growth in such countries (for example, in the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union, WAEMU). 
Third, the estimated GLC-maximizing tax-rate is between 15% and 25%, namely below 
the corresponding value for developed countries (located between 35% and 60%, see footnote 
1 in the Introduction). On the one hand, such a low value may suggest that taxes are highly 
distorsive in developing countries, a result in accordance with microeconomic studies (see, for 
example, Gauthier & Reinikka, 2006, and Fisman & Svensson, 2007). However, on the other 
hand, our finding may describe a relatively low productivity of taxes, due to a poor allocation 
of Government resources. In this case, raising the share of productive public spending (public 
investment) may enhance both the efficiency of the tax system and economic growth. 
Finally, our analysis may contribute to the debate concerning the “fiscal space” for 
developing countries, which explores the optimal way in which different financing methods 
may be used to finance Government spending. As acknowledged by the IMF or Heller (2005), 
a Government may enhance the efficiency within the fiscal space by either raising the 
productivity of public spending (allowing for a larger share of public investment or more 
productive public investment) or cutting fiscal deficits. In addition to this evidence, using 
money as a financing instrument should be carefully supervised, since high money growth 
rates may generate large inflation rates, which may reduce the real value of available 
seigniorage resources. 
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Appendix 1 : Resolution of the model 
 
Defining ttt MBA +≡  and tt KZ &≡ , the current Hamiltonian becomes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttttttt
ttttttttttc
GZCMMBAqKZ
ZMCGKFBrCUH
++−+−−+−+
−−−−++=
φµδλ
piτλ
2
1 ,1
 
 
where 1λ  and 2λ  are the costate variables associated respectively with tA  and tK , and q  and 
µ  are the multiplier of static constraints. First order conditions are (time indexes are 
henceforth omitted): 
 
M/ : q+= 1piλµ          (A1a) 
B/ : 1λrq =          (A1b) 
C/ : ( ) ( )11 /1 λφµλ +=CUC        (A1c) 
Z/ : 112 /1/ λφµλλ +=         (A1d) 
A/ : q−= 11 βλλ&          (A1e) 
K/ : ( ) ( ) 2122 /1/ λτλδβλλ KFK−−+=&       (A1f) 
 
 From (A1a) and (A1b) we obtain the nominal interest rate: 1/ λµpi =+= rR . First 
order conditions (A1c-A1f) can be rewritten as: 
 
C/ : ( ) ( )RCUC φλ += 11         (A2a) 
Z/ : Rφλλ += 1/ 12         (A2b) 
A/ : r−= βλλ 11 /&          (A2c) 
K/ : ( ) ( ) ( )RKFK φτδβλλ +−−+= 1/1/ 22&      (A2d) 
 
As usual with a CIA constraint on consumption, the nominal interest rate introduces a 
wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the shadow price of wealth ( )1λ  in 
(A2a). If 0φ > , the rate of return of investment must also be deflated by the cost of financing 
( )1 tRφ+  in (A2d). In addition, the CIA constraint on investment introduces a wedge between 
the real return of wealth (the real interest rate r  in (A2c)) and the net return of investment  
( ( ) ( ) ( ) δφτ −+− RFK 1/.1  in (A2d)), since wealth does not allow acquiring capital goods 
directly. Note that this wedge disappears if 0φ = , as 21 λλ =  in (A2d). Thus, the Keynes-
Ramsey relation is ( ) ( )[ ] σφφφλλ /1/// 11 RRRCC R +++−= &&& . 
 
Goods market equilibrium yields the IS curve ( ) ( ) ( ) δε −−−= − KGKCKGKK //// 1& , 
money market equilibrium provides piω −=MM /&  and the money constraint is, in 
equilibrium, YM φ= . The deficit (long run public debt) to GDP ratio is YBd /&=  ( θ=YB / ) 
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )KBKMKBKYKBKGrBB ////////// ηωτ −−+=&  is the Government budget 
constraint. Using intensive variables KCc /= , KGg /= , KYKMm // φ==  and KBb /= , 
we find: 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )δσφφφβ ε −−−−++−−= − gcgRRRrcc R 1/1// &&     (A3a) 
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )φφτεδφ ε +−−++= − RgrRR R/11 1&       (A3b) ( )δεε −−−−= −− gcgbdgbb 11 //&        (A3c) 
( )δω ε −−−−−+= − gcgRrmm 1/&        (A3d) 
εφ −= 1gm           (A3e) 
( ) rbmgdg −=+− − ηωτ ε1         (A3f) 
 
In an Appendix available on request we show that the reduced form of our model is 
composed of three differential equations in c , b  and R  and that the equilibrium is saddle-
point stable. To find the steady-state endogenous growth solution, we impose 
0==== Rbmc &&&& , thus initial variables c , k , b , g  and m  grow at the same constant rate *γ , 
while R , r  and pi  are constant. We find (7) in the main text from (A3a), with the real interest 
rate from (A3b). Finally, we find (8) in the main text from (A3f) and (A3e) namely: ( )** rg −−+= γθηωφτε , with θγ *=d  in steady-state and ( ) ( )**** 1 γγσβγ Sr =−−=− . 
 
Appendix 2: List of Countries (48 countries in our sample) 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, 
Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Per capita GDP growth 163 0.769 3.3 -9.932 9.408 
Tax revenue (% GDP) 163 19.27 8.170 4.049 46.259 
Deficit (% GDP) 163 4.895 5.168 -11.745 22.098 
Seigniorage (% GDP) 163 1.094 1.696 -0.492 19.249 
Population Growth 163 2.385 1.119 -5.128 7.413 
Investment (% GDP) 163 20.967 7.928 5.629 60.496 
Initial GDP per capita (log) 163 6.248 0.843 4.395 8.07 
Education 163 12.84 9.479 0.5 42.2 
Openness 163 64.364 31.121 13.95 156.385 
 
Appendix 4: Classification according to the exchange rate arrangements 
Fix or quasi fix exchange rate regime: 
Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Congo Republic, Fiji, Honduras, Jordan, 
Lesotho, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Senegal, Zimbabwe. 
 
Flexible or quasi flexible exchange rate regime: 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
